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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
B.: Evidence--Admissibility of Indictments in Civil Cases in Federal
tion. Elder v. Elder, 139 Va. 19, 123 S. E. 369 (1924); Greco v.
Greco, 121 Ad. 666 (Del. 1923). Contra: Thompson v. Thompson,
49 Nev. 375, 247 Pac.,545 (1926). Whether Norman v. Norman,
supra, so holds is not quite clear from the opinion but such would
seem to be the law, from the inference in Currence v. Currence,
supra. In Myers v. Myers, 127 W. Va. 551, 33 S. E.2d 897 (1945),
an attempt at reconciliation was made consisting of husband and
wife kissing each other and going to bed together after a quarrel.
The court held that such conduct did not amount to a condonation
or reconciliation of differences between the parties as respects the
wife's right to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. From the above authorities it would seem that something
more than a mere intent to forgive and isolated acts of coition
would be necessary to constitute condonation.
It is said that condonation as an affirmative defense is favored
by the law. Brown v. Brown, 51 R. I. 132, 134, 152 Atl. 423 (1930).
But in divorce cases where a determination is made by the trial
court upon the evidence, the findings of the trial chancellor should
be given great weight, Maxwell v. Maxwell, 75 W. Va. 521, 84 S. E.
25 (1915); here, the trial court refused to find condonation. As
was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Kenna in the
instant case, "If condonation is to become the likely result of unsuccessful efforts to become reconciled, it is certain that the person
whos6 rights have been injured will be extremely apprehensive of
the slightest gesture that might result in surrendering a legal right
to relief. It will result in fewer, not more reconciliations." The
authorities and the more nearly analogous cases seem to support the
dissent.

J. F. S., Jr.
EVIDENCE -

ADMISSIBILITY OF INDICTMENTS IN CIVIL CASES IN

FEDERAL COuRT.-A and B were jointly sued for the conversion of

money. They introduced evidence of their general good character.
They objected to the introduction of testimony by the plaintiff that
they had had been jointly indicted for an earlier crime, receiving
stolen property, in 1931 and 1933. On both occasions A pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. No further proceedings, beyond the indictment, were taken against B as to the 1931 indictment; but he
pleaded guilty to the 1933 indictment and later was permitted to
withdraw his plea and the case as to him was dropped. The trial

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1949

1

CASELaw
COMMENTS
West Virginia
Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 7
court admitted this testimony. Held, on appeal, that evidence rebutting defendants' good character was admissible; and the testimony concerning the indictments of the defendants was admissible
for all purposes against both defendants. Judgment affirmed.
Mourikas v. Vardianos, 169 F.2d 53 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
The court correctly recognized the general rule that indictments are inadmissible. In the instant case A was a witness in his
own behalf, and B was probably also a witness. But an indictment
is inadmissible to impeach the credibility of a witness because it involves a violation of the hearsay rule. Kennedy v. International
Great Northern Ry., 1 S. W.2d 581 (Tex. Comp. App. 1928); 3
WIGMOw,, EvIDENCE § 980 (a) (3d ed. 1940). But cf. State v. Maslin,
195 N. C. 537, 143 S. E. 3 (1928) (an indictment is much more than
a mere charge). It would seem that the same objection could be
made to the use of indictments as a means of rebutting good character and that they should also be inadmissible for that purpose.
The court, however, holds them admissible because of the
following circumstances: (1) the indictments were against the
same joint defendants now defending the civil suit; (2) the indictments were followed by pleas of guilty, although withdrawn as
to B; and (3) the rules of evidence favoring admissibility shall be
applied because of FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a).
As to the first factor, the fact that the indictments and
present suit were against the same persons would seem important
only because the same parties were involved and not because the
indictments were joint and the present action joint. As to the
second, the pleas of guilty following the indictments would seem
important for it is a much stronger evidentiary fact. A withdrawn
pleading is generally admissible against the pleader. Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsenv. Dexter and Carpenter,Inc., 32 F.2d 195 (C. C.
A.2d 1925); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1067. Contra: Ralph v. Hensler, 114 Cal.'196, 45 Pac. 1062 (1896). A plea of guilty is admissible in the trial of a civil action to which the person making the
plea is a party where the plea is relevant to an issue tried in the
civil case. Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 23 N. E.2d 411
(1939); c. Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va.
156, 159, 112 S. E. 301, 303 (1922) (conviction on a plea of guilty
admissible). In West Virginia a withdrawn declaration is inadmissible. Bartley v. Western Maryland Ry., 81 W. Va. 795, 95 S.
E. 443 (1918). But cf. State v. Fisher, 123 W. Va. 745, 752, 18 S.
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E.2d 649, 652 (1941) (verified plea). This latter case raises some
doubt as to whether West Virginia will continue to follow the
Bartley case. The better view favors the admissibility of a withdrawn plea. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1067. Therefore, it would
seem sounder and more logical to have admitted the evidence as a
withdrawn plea and the indictment as a part thereof. As to the
third reason, the fact that FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a) applies, there seems
to be a valid reason for assigning some importance to this. In cases
of doubt as to the admissibility of evidence it should be admitted. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, 162 F.2d 779 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
Neff v. PennsylvaniaR. R., 7 F. R. D. 532 (1948). The intent of
Rule 43 (a) is admissibility not exclusion. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 68 (Supp. 1947).
As a matter of policy it would seem that there are conflicting
arguments: (1) the admission of this testimony would result in
the defendants' being prejudiced because of prior wrongs; or (2)
all evidence should be admitted if it will aid in reaching a true
decision. Since the federal courts are bound by FED. R. Civ. P.
43 (a) favoring admissibility, the result in the instant case would
seem correct. Even in state courts where this rule does not apply
the sounder approach would be to admit such evidence as a withdrawn plea.
D. A. B.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT

-

CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT -

ALLOWANCE OF REASONABLE ATORNEY's FEE UNDER FLSA CONDITIONED UPON

ATORNEY'S. SURRENDER

OF CONTINGENT FEE AGREE-

MENT. - In an action by an employee against his employer for over-

time wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060
(1938), as amended 29 U. S. C. §201 (Supp. 1948), the trial court
awarded the plaintiff overtime wages, an equal amount as liquidated damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee. Plaintiff had a
contingent fee agreement with his counsel for compensation in
addition to that which the court would allow. Held, on appeal,
that this private agreement is invalid as being contrary to the purpose of the Act, and the judgment is modified so as to make the
payment of the fee fixed by the court conditional upon the attorney's surrender of all rights to additional compensation under his
agreement with the plaintiff. Affirmed as modified. Harrington
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